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Comment
Polygraph Evidence: Where Are We Now?
I. INTRODUCTION
Polygraph evidence has been the pariah of the courtroom since the adoption
of the "general acceptance" test for the admission of scientific evidence in Frye
v. United States.' While the Frye court's decision to exclude lie detector
evidence was correctly based upon the state of polygraph technology at that
time, many courts have subsequently failed to recognize the many advances in
polygraphy and have excluded test results without further consideration.2
Indeed, polygraph evidence seems to be considered by courts, in practice if not
in actual theory, to be sui generis. Recent trends toward the recognition of
polygraph evidence as having a degree of reliability have resulted in many
courts taking a new look at the admissibility of polygraph evidence While
many other courts have modified their outdated approaches to the admission of
polygraph evidence, Missouri courts are still applying the Frye test4 and, it




The polygraph examination works on the principle that a person who is
telling the truth has different physiological reactions than a person who is telling
a lie.6 The polygraph machine is equipped with various sensors that can detect
changes in "blood pressure-pulse, respiration, and galvanic skin resistance."7
The machine measures changes in the subject's physiological reactions as the
examiner asks questions and records both the questions and the answers These
changes in the test subject's physiological responses result from stress or fear of
being discovered telling a lie.9 Therefore, the test subject's belief in the
accuracy of the results of the polygraph examination is needed to ensure an
1. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
2. See infra notes 74-128 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 129-33 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 132-36 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 134-46 and accompanying text.
6. See Paul C. Giannelli, Forensic Science: Polygraph Evidence: Part 1, 30 CRIM.
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accurate test. If the subject is telling the truth but is worried that the test may
falsely indicate deception, there is a possibility that the examiner will mistakenly
attribute physiological responses to deception. Likewise, if the subject is telling
a lie but is firmly convinced that the test will not reflect it, the examiner may not
detect any physiological response.
While experts in polygraphy use several different methods of examining
test subjects, one of the most common is the Control Question Technique
(CQT).' ° In CQT, the examiner asks three types of questions: neutral, relevant,
and control." Neutral questions aire those questions designed to determine the
subject's normal response to truthful answers. 2 Examples of neutral questions
are: "Is your name [subject's name]?," or "Do you live at [subject's address]?"'13
Relevant questions are related to the subject matter of the examination.'4
Examples of relevant questions are: "Did you [commit this crime]?," or "Do
you know anything [about this crime]?"'" Control questions are more general
questions dealing with areas similar to those covered in the subject matter
questions. 16 For example, "Before the age of 25, did you ever take anything that
was not yours?," or "Before the age of 21, did you ever lie to get out of
trouble?"17 Control questions are designed to make most people lie and so are
also termed "probable lie questions."' 8 The theory behind the use of control
questions has been explained as follows: The control question deals with similar
subject matter, is very general in nature, covers a long span of time and a large
number of possible acts, and is almost impossible for most people to answer with
an unequivocal "no" and with certainty that they are being completely truthful.
If the subject answers "yes" to the control question, the examiner should ask
about the incident and then ask, "Except for that incident [the subject of the
original query]?" This process should continue until the subject answers "No."
Only then will the result be useful because only then has the subject indicated
doubt about whether the answer is strictly true. 19
The polygraph expert then examines the results-the subject's
physiological reactions in relation to the subject's responses. The key to the
10. See Id. at 267; DAVID T. LYKKEN, THE PROBITY OF THE POLYGRAPH, THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL PROCEDURE 95-123 (Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence
S. Wrightsman eds., 1985); Gordon H. Barland, Standards for the Admissibility of
Polygraph Results as Evidence, 16 U. WESTL.A. L. REV. 37, 46 (1984).
11. See Gianelli, supra note 6, at 267.
12. See Gianelli, supra note 6, at 267.
13. See Gianelli, supra note 6, at 267.
14. See Gianelli, supra note 6, at 267.
15. See Gianelli, supra note 6, at 267.
16. See Gianelli, supra note 6, at 267.
17. See Gianelli, supra note 6, at 267.
18. See Gianelli, supra note 6, at 267.
19. See David C. Raskin, Science, Competence, and Polygraph Techniques, 8
CRIM. DEF. 11, 13 (1981).
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analysis is in the comparison of the control questions and the relevant questions.
"Generally, the truthful person will respond more to the control questions than
to the relevant questions because they represent a greater threat to that person." 20
The reverse is also true. Generally, the deceptive person will have a greater
reaction to the relevant questions.2' The greater the difference between the
subject's responses, the easier it is for the examiner to establish the
conclusiveness of the test.22 In CQT, as well as in other testing methods, the
examiner conducts a pre-test interview with the test subject. 2 This interview is
important for two reasons: (1) The examiner must demonstrate the accuracy of
the test so that the physiological responses recorded will be accurate; and (2) the
examiner must determine with particularity what questions will be asked.24 In
order to ensure that the changes in physiological reactions, which the polygraph
machine is designed to record, are a result of deception, the testee must believe
that the machine is accurate. 2s During the pre-test interview, the examiner will
conduct a demonstration of, or give a lecture on, the machine's accuracy. The
pre-test interview also allows the examiner to determine which questions should
be asked.26 For example, if the subject is accused of committing a crime at a
particular location and admits that he was at the location near the time of the
crime, asking the subject if he was at the location of the crime may not be the
best question. Presumably, it would be better to ask a more specific question
about whether the subject committed the crime. However, if the subject denies
being in the state on the day of the crime, asking the subject if he was at the
location of the crime may be effective. The experience of the polygraph
examiner is a relevant factor in the accuracy of polygraph examinations in all
respects;27 however, it has been noted that the experience of the examiner is most
important with regard to the pre-test interview.28
B. Admissibility of Scientific Evidence
As previously stated, Frye was the first case to address the issue of the
admissibility of polygraph evidence. In Frye, the defendant offered an expert
witness to testify to the result of a systolic blood pressure deception test.29 The
court acknowledged that expert testimony is admissible in cases where the
20. Giannelli, supra note 6, at 267.
21. See Giannelli, supra note 6, at 267.
22. See Giannelli, supra note 6, at 267.
23. See Giannelli, supra note 6, at 266.
24. See Giannelli, supra note 6, at 266.
25. See Giannelli, supra note 6, at 266.
26. See Giannelli, supra note 6, at 266.
27. See Giannelli, supra note 6, at 263.
28. See Raskin, supra note 19, at 12.
29. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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question involved "does not lie within the common experience or common
knowledge." 30 However, the court held that, "while courts will go a long way
in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific
principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field
in which it belongs."' The court went on to hold that the systolic blood pressure
deception test had not gained the requisite general acceptance.
32
The "general acceptance" test espoused in Frye went on to become the
primary test for admission of scientific evidence in nearly every state and federal
court.33 Accordingly, Frye became the basis for excluding polygraph evidence
in virtually every jurisdiction for fifty years.34 Thereafter, courts increasingly
criticized use of Frye to exclude polygraph evidence.35 Critics of Frye began to
argue, with a great deal of success, that the "general acceptance" test prohibited
the use of reliable and useful techniques or principles until they had received
widespread peer approval.36 Frye was also criticized for failing to explain how
courts should connect novel techniques or methods to specific fields of science.37
Determining which scientific field was relevant was problematic, and courts
expanded or narrowed the definition of the relevant field to manipulate
admissibility of evidence. 3' Further problems emerged when parties began to
manipulate admissibility by asserting that the relevant field should be narrowed
to a sub-specialty within that field.39
Congress's enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975 produced
further ammunition for critics of Frye. Rule 70240 deals with the admission of




33. See Edward I Imwinkelried, The Standard for Admitting Scientific Evidence:
A Critique from the Perspective of Juror Psychology, 28 VILL. L. REV. 554, 556-57
(1983) (stating that the "general acceptance" test became "the almost universal view" in
most federal and state courts).
34. See Charles M. Sevilla, Polygraph 1984: Behind the Closed Door of
Admissibility, 16 U. WEST L.A. L. REV. 5, 6 (1984).
35. See, e.g., U.S. v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529, 1532 (1lth Cir. 1989); CHARLES
T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 203, at 628 (3d ed. 1984).
36. See William P. Haney, I, Comment, Scientific Evidence in the Age ofDaubert:
A Proposalfor a Dual Standard ofAdmissibility in Civil and Criminal Cases, 21 PEPP.
L. REV. 1391, 1397 (1994).
37. Id.
38. See Gianelli, supra note 6, at 1208-11.
39. See Gianelli, supra note 6, at 1208-11.
40. Rule 702 states: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EVID. 702.
[Vol. 65
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text of the Rule nor the Advisory Committee notes mention Frye.4' Therefore,
the critics pointed out, the admissibility of scientific evidence under Rule 702
does not have to meet the Frye test.
42
Finally, in 1993, the Supreme Court rejected Frye's "general acceptance"
test. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,43 the court held that the
general acceptance requirement of Frye was at odds with the more liberal
approach to the admissibility of opinion testimony contained in the Federal
Rules." While the court recognized that the trial judge must still "ensure that
any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but
reliable," the court went on to find that Frye was not, in and of itself, the proper
test.
45
While holding that there is no definitive checklist or test that a trial judge
should use when deciding admissibility, the court did suggest a nonexclusive list
of factors that should be considered. 41 These factors include: (1) whether the
theory or technique can be tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has been
subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the theory or technique's known
or potential rate of error; and (4) whether the theory or technique has been
generally accepted within the relevant scientific community.47 Under this new
standard, trial judges play a much larger role. Instead of merely asking what
other scientists think of a particular technique or method, the judge now
determines whether the proponent of the evidence has demonstrated that the
evidence is "good evidence, perhaps in spite of what other experts think about
it.""
Because each state has its own law of evidence, the effect that Daubert has
had upon the states is somewhat varied. "Because Daubert was premised on an
interpretation of a federal rule of evidence, its rejection of Frye is not binding
authority for state courts.'A9 Although some states now employ Daubert, or a
similar approach, as their standard for analyzing the admissibility of scientific
41. Edward J. Imwinkelied, The Daubert Decision on the Admissibility of Scientific
Evidence: The Supreme Court Chooses the Right Piece for All the Evidentiary Puzzles,
9 ST. JoHN's J. LEGAL COMMENT. 5, 22 (1993).
42. Id.
43. 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993).
44. Id. at 588.
45. Id. at 589.
46. Id. at 593.
47. Id. at 593-94.
48. G. Michael Fenner, The Daubert Handbook: The Case, Its EssentialDilemma,
and Its Progeny, 29 CREIGHTON L. REv. 939, 952 (1996).
49. State v. Porter, 698 A.2d 739, 745 (Conn. 1997).
2000]
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evidence,50 some states continue to follow Frye.5 Several states, including
Missouri, have not addressed Daubert's effect in their jurisdictions. 2
III. ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
POLYGRAPH EVIDENCE
A. Polygraph Unreliability
Arguably, the most often cited reason for excluding polygraph results is that
the polygraph test is unreliable.53 While the test's accuracy rate is still being
debated, it is clear that the modem polygraph is much more accurate than the
systolic blood pressure deception test that was under examination in Frye. One
study by polygraph enthusiasts claims that ninety-four percent of all subjects can
be tested accurately, with less than one percent error.54 Another study claims to
50. Fourteen states follow a standard for admissibility similar to Daubert: Georgia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin. Fourteen states have addressed the
issue and now apply Daubert: Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Vermont,
West Virginia, and Wyoming. See Loyd C. Peeples et al., Exculpatory Polygraphs in the
Courtroom: How the Truth May Not Set You Free, 28 CuMB. L. REV. 77, 115 n.60 (1997-
1998).
51. Currently eleven states have considered Daubert and rejected it in favor of
Frye: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Nebraska, New
Jersey, New York, and Washington. See Peeples, supra note 50, at 115 n.61.
52. Eleven states have either merely noted Daubert and taken no action to accept
or reject it or have not addressed the issue at all: Alabama, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and
Rhode Island. See Peeples, supra note 50, at 115 n.62.
53. See, e.g., United States v. Scarborough, 43 F.3d 1021, 1026 (6th Cir. 1994)
(holding that polygraph results are "inherently unreliable"); People v. Baynes, 430 N.E.2d
1070, 1079 (Ill. 1981) ("Polygraph evidence is not reliable enough to be admitted.");
State v. Ulland, 943 P.2d 947, 954 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997) (stating that "the results of a
polygraph examination are too unreliable to be admissible at trial"); Morgan v.
Commonwealth, 809 S.W.2d 704, 706 (Ky. 1991) ("The results of polygraph
examinations are unreliable and are therefore inadmissible in evidence."); People v.
Leone, 255 N.E.2d 696, 700 (N.Y. 1969) (holding that the polygraph's reliability had not
been established); Fulton v. State, 541 P.2d 871, 872 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975) (stating
that polygraphs are not admissible because of "the potential unreliability of polygraph
examinations"); Commonwealth ex rel. Riccio v. Dilworth, 115 A.2d 865, 867 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1955) ("The reliability and scientific infallibility of the polygraph.., must be
more definitely established before our courts will accept their results as credible."); Lee
v. Commonwealth, 105 S.E.2d 152, 155 (Va. 1958) ("stating that [polygraph] tests
generally have not as yet been proved scientifically reliable"); Peeples, supra note 50, at
93.
54. JOHN E. REID & FRED E. INBAU, TRUTH AND DECEPTION: THE POLYGRAPH ("LIE
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have achieved definite results 95.6% of the time, with only three known errors
out of 4,093 reports.55 Two other experimental studies reported that a
experienced polygraph examiner could correctly identify one hundred percent
of all innocent students, and eighty-eight to ninety-four percent of all guilty
students.5 6 In yet another carefully controlled study, experts concluded that
polygraph examiners can determine truth or deception in better than eighty-
seven percent of all cases. 7
While it is certainly understandable why the fallibility of polygraph
evidence would cause concern with its admission, it is unclear why this creates
a complete bar to admission. Courts routinely allow admission of scientific
evidence that cannot be verified as one hundred percent accurate. Various
courts have admitted expert evidence of controversial scientific reliability, such
as psychological evidence of child abuse,59 post-hypnotic identification by a
victim,6 evidence concerning rape trauma syndrome,6' and evidence concerning
battered women syndrome.62 While psychiatric judgment expert testimony and
polygraphy may be used to prove vastly different types of evidence, there is no
escaping the fact that expert testimony concerning psychiatric judgments is far
less reliable than polygraph results.63 However, it has long been accepted as
standard practice to admit expert psychiatric testimony. If one accepts the
proposition that psychiatric judgment testimony is less reliable than, or at least
only as reliable as, polygraph evidence, then the reliability argument seems to
be applied differently with regards to the two types of evidence. While it is true
that the two types of evidence are admitted for different purposes, there does not
seem to be any reason to admit unreliable evidence for one purpose and not the
other. Presumably, as with psychiatric testimony, argument from the party
opposing the evidence and rebuttal testimony from her own expert would
sufficiently apprise the trier of fact of the fallibility of the polygraph results.
DETECTOR") TECHNIQUE 234 (1966).
55. See FRED E. INBAU, LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION (1968).
56. See P.O. Davidson, Validity of the Guilty Knowledge Technique: The Effects
of Motivation, 52 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 63-64 (1968).
57. See Frank S. Hovarth et al., The Reliability of Polygraph Examiner Diagnosis
of Truth and Deception, 62 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY 276 (1971).
58. See Bruce J. Ennis et al., Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise:
Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CAL. L. REv. 693 (1974).
59. See United States v. Tsinnijinnie, 91 F.3d 1285, 1288 (9th Cir. 1996).
60. See White v. Ieyoub, 25 F.3d 245, 247 (5th Cir. 1994).
61. See United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392, 399 (C.M.A. 1993).
62. See Arcoren v. United States, 929 F.2d 1235, 1241 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 913 (1991).
63. Id. at 736.
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B. Lack of Standardized Procedures
Another often cited reason for excluding polygraph evidence under Frye is
the lack of standardized procedures in administering the actual polygraph test
and in qualifying test examiners.' With the adoption of the Daubert standard,
courts will rarely be able to refuse to admit polygraph evidence on this basis so
long as the evidence appears to be reliable in each individual case. 5 Even in
those jurisdictions that still follow Frye, this problem could easily be remedied
by the adoption of standardized procedures for polygraph examiners. In United
States v. Dominguez,6 a Texas federal court proposed several factors to be
considered in determining whether polygraph evidence should be considered
reliable:
(1) That all parties be present to observe the proceedings. (2) That
there be a legal commitment irrevocably allowing the admission of the
results by both sides. (3) That the subject commit to be examined by
any polygraphic expert designated by the other side. (4) When more
than one exam is contemplated, the choice of the first examiner take
place by chance. (5) That the pre-test interview be allowed by all
sides with all sides present. (6) That the post-test interview be
allowed by all sides with all sides present. (7) That immediately prior
the test the subject be examined for any sedative or drugs in his body.
(8) That the rules that do not admit character evidence for truthfulness
be legally waived. (9) That no questions be permitted to the mental
state of the defendant at the time of the alleged commission of the
event. (10) The failure of the Defendant to make himself available to
testify in the case should also be a consideration.67
These factors could be adopted, in whole or in part, as standard procedures.
However, Frye contemplated that the standardized procedures would be adopted
by the scientific community because of necessity and would thus be indicative
of reliability. Judicial adoption of standardized procedures would not fix the
problem, but would merely cover up the deficiency.
64. See, e.g., People v. Anderson, 637 P.2d 354, 358 (Colo. 1981) (stating that
sufficient standards for qualification of polygraph examiners do not "exist to insure
competent examination procedures and accurate interpretation of the polygram"); State
v. Governor, 331 So. 2d 443, 449 (La. 1976) (noting lack of standardization important);
People v. Davis, 72 N.W.2d 269, 282 (Mich. 1955) (stating that "[w]e should not
[consider admitting polygraphs] before ... standardization [is] clearly shown"); State v.
Dean, 307 N.W.2d 628, 653 (Wis. 1981) (stating that lack of standards important in
ruling polygraph evidence inadmissible).
65. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
66. 902 F. Supp. 737 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
67. Id. at 740-41 (footnote omitted).
[Vol. 65
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C. Undue Influence on the Jury
While the two previously discussed problems may be, at least to a large
degree, remedied through scientific advancements and improvements in the
polygraph field, the undue influence argument would seem to apply to a
polygraph examination with one hundred percent reliability. It is often stated
that polygraph evidence will infringe upon the province of the jury to determine
credibility of witnesses and will have an undue influence on the jury's
decision.' This argument ignores the safeguards inherent in ourjudicial system:
the judge may give instructions regarding the evidence,69 lawyers may argue the
relative fallibility of polygraph testing, and the jury will have the good sense to
weigh the evidence according to its value.7" Moreover, the same rationale
supporting the argument for the exclusion of polygraph evidence because of
undue influence is applicable to other probative scientific evidence, such as rape
trauma syndrome evidence, which is nonetheless routinely admitted.7
D. Other Evidentiary Objections
As courts become more willing to ignore the arguments outlined above for
exclusion of polygraph evidence, they will be forced to deal with nonscientific
evidentiary objections.7' Three objections often tendered in this vein are that:
(1) testimony concerning polygraph results violates the hearsay rule; that
(2) testimony concerning polygraphy results is inadmissible unless the accused
elects to testify at trial; and that (3) testimony concerning polygraphy results is
inadmissible as proof of the subject's character trait of truthfulness.73
68. See Peeples, supra note 50, at 94-95.
69. For example, the judge could instruct the jury that the evidence may be used
in the determination of a specific issue and not for the determination of the ultimate guilt
or innocence of the accused.
70. See Thomas K. Downs, Note, Admission ofPolygraph Results: A Due Process
Perspective, 55 IND. L.J. 157, 175-76 (1979).
71. See ROBERT J. GOODWIN & JIMMY GuRuLE, CRIMINAL AND SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE 52, 382-409 (1997). The authors explain how expert testimony concerning
rape trauma syndrome affects the weight of the evidence at trial. "In cases that are
essentially swearing matches between the accused and the victim, expert testimony that
the victim suffered from symptoms that are associated with forcible rape strengthens the
case for lack of consent." Id. at 385.
72. As used in this Comment, "nonscientific evidentiary objections" are objections
that are not based on the outcome of the Frye or Daubert approaches to admissibility.
73. See Edward J. Imwinkelried et al., Issues Once Moot: The Other Evidentiary
Objections to the Admission of Exculpatory Polygraph Examinations, 32 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 1045 (1997).
2000]
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IV. APPROACHES TO ADMISSIBILITY
Jurisdictions approach the admissibility of polygraph evidence in a variety
of ways. Courts generally employ one of three main approaches: per se
inadmissibility, stipulated admissibility, and admissibility under certain
circumstances.
A. Per Se Inadmissibility
From the Frye decision in 1923 until 1974, no appellate court upheld a trial
court's admission of polygraph evidence.74 Following Frye, most jurisdictions
adopted the rule that polygraph evidence was not admissible under any
circumstances, or, in other words, was per se inadmissable. s Under this
approach, polygraph evidence by either party is barred regardless of its purpose.
Per se inadmissibility is the most widely adopted approach among the states.76
Per se inadmissibility poses constitutional problems with regard to
exculpatory polygraph results. The right of the criminal defendant to present
evidence in his defense is based on both the Sixth Amendment Compulsory
74. See James R. McCall, Misconceptions and Reevaluation-Polygraph
Admissibility After Rock and Daubert, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 363, 370 (1996).
75. Id.
76. Currently, the following twenty-seven states have a per se inadmissibility rule:
Alaska (Troyer v. State, 614 P.2d 313, 319 (Alaska 1980)); Colorado (People v.
Anderson, 637 P.2d 354, 358 (Colo. 1981)); Connecticut (State v. Porter, 698 A.2d 739,
779 (Conn. 1997)); Hawaii (State v. Antone, 615 P.2d 101, 109 (Haw. 1980)); Illinois
(People v. Gard, 632 N.E.2d 1026, 1032 (Ill. 1994)); Kentucky (Morton v.
Commonwealth, 809 S.W.2d 704, 706 (Ky. 1991)); Maine (State v. Harnish, 560 A.2d
5, 8 (Me. 1989)); Maryland (State v. Hawkins, 604 A.2d 489, 492 (Md. 1992));
Massachusetts (Commonwealth v. Stewart, 663 N.E.2d 255,259 (Mass. 1996)); Michigan
(People v. Davis, 72 N.W.2d 269, 281-82 (Mich. 1955)); Minnesota (State v. Opsahl, 513
N.W.2d 249, 253 (Minn. 1994)); Missouri (State v. Burch, 939 S.W.2d 525, 528 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1997)); Montana (State v. Staat, 811 P.2d 1261, 1262 (Mont. 1991)); Nebraska
(State v. Allen, 560 N.W.2d 829, 842 (Neb. 1997)); New Hampshire (State v. Ober, 493
A.2d 493,493 (N.H. 1985)); New York (People v. Angelo, 666 N.E.2d 1333, 1335 (N.Y.
1996)); North Carolina (State v. Jones, 466 S.E.2d 696, 700 (N.C.1996)); Oklahoma
(Paxton v. State, 867 P.2d 1309, 1323 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993)); Oregon (State v. Lyon,
744 P.2d 231, 231 (Or. 1987)); Pennsylvania (Commonwealth v. Brockington, 455 A.2d
627, 629 (Pa. 1983)); Rhode Island (In re Odell, 672 A.2d 457, 459 (R.I. 1996)); South
Dakota (State v. Muetze, 368 N.W.2d 575, 588 (S.D. 1985)); Tennessee (State v.
Campbell, 904 S.W.2d 608, 614-15 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995)); Texas (Moon v. State, 856
S.W.2d 276, 279 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993)); Vermont (State v. Hamlin, 499 A.2d 45, 54 (Vt.
1985)); Virginia (Taylor v. Commonwealth, 348 S.E.2d 36, 38 (Va. Ct. App. 1986)); and
Wisconsin, State v. Dean (307 N.W.2d 628, 629 (Wis. 1981)). The District of Columbia
also bars the use of polygraph evidence. See Contee v. United States, 667 A.2d 103, 104
(D.C. 1995). See also Peeples, supra note 50, at 97.
[Vol. 65
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Process Clause and the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.77 The Supreme
Court generally has been very diligent in protecting this constitutionally
guaranteed right.78 However, in United States v. Scheffer,79 the Court, in an eight
to one decision, upheld the constitutionality of a military rule excluding any
polygraph evidence, including that which is exculpatory, from being used in
courts-martial."0 It should be noted, however, that in making this ruling, four of
the concurring justices believed that the per se ban was "unwise." 81 In order to
form a better understanding of the decision in Scheffer, it is necessary to
examine Chambers v. Mississippi2 and Rock v. Arkansas.
8 3
In Chambers, the Supreme Court held that the defendant's due process
rights were violated by a state hearsay rule that had compromised the
defendant's right to call witnesses in his behalf.84 A trial court in Mississippi
had convicted Chambers of murdering a policeman. After Chambers had been
arrested for the crime, another man, McDonald, repeatedly confessed to having
committed the murder.8 6 Of course, Chambers's main defense was that
McDonald, the confessor, and not Chambers, actually committed the murder.87
The prosecution did not call McDonald as a witness for the state, but Chambers
called McDonald as a defense witness.88 McDonald repudiated his prior
confession on the stand, and the prosecution argued that McDonald was not an
77. For a detailed discussion of the right to present a defense, see Robert N.
Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An Emergent Constitutional Guarantee in
Criminal Trials, 9 IND. L. REV. 711 (1976).
78. See, e.g., Washington v. State, 388 U.S. 14, 16-17 (1967) (invalidating a Texas
statute that provided that "persons charged or convicted as coparticipants in the same
crime could not testify for one another, although [they could testify] for the State" on the
grounds that the defendant's right to have compulsory process was violated in that the
state "arbitrarily denied him the right to put on the stand a witness... whose testimony
would have been relevant and material to the defense"); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410
U.S. 284, 302 (1973) (holding that when the constitutional right to present evidence in
one's defense is directly affected "the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically"
because "[flew rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses
in his own defense"); Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987) (striking down a per se
exclusion of hypnotically refreshed recollection asserting that "[a] State's legitimate
interest in barring unreliable evidence does not extend to per se exclusions that may be
reliable in an individual case").
79. 523 U.S. 303 (1998).
80. Id. at317.
81. Id. at.
82. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
83. 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
84. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302.
85. Id. at 285.
86. Id. at 287-88.
87. Id. at 289.
88. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 291 (1973).
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adverse witness because he had never implicated Chambers." The trial judge
agreed with the argument and did not allow Chambers to cross-examine
McDonald as an adverse witness.90
In support of his defense, Chambers sought to introduce testimony from
three witnesses that they each heard McDonald say that he committed the
murder.9' The court ruled that the testimony was inadmissible hearsay.92 In
addressing the trial judge's hearsay ruling, the Supreme Court noted that when
a constitutional right such as the right to present evidence in one's defense is
directly affected, "the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat
the ends of justice."93 Additionally, the Court noted that the right to present
witnesses on one's behalf is an essential component of due process. 94 The Court
held that Chambers's due process rights had been violated and reversed the
conviction.95
The Court did not, however, go so far as to rule that all evidence favorable
to the defendant should be admitted. The Court tempered its holding by stating
that "[i]n reaching this judgment, we establish no new principles of
constitutional law. Nor does our holding signal any diminution in the respect
traditionally accorded to the States in the establishment and implementation of
their own criminal trial rules and procedures." 96 The Court also noted that "the
right to confront and cross-examine is not absolute and may, in appropriate
cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial
process."97  Chambers stands for the proposition that exclusionary rules
conflicting with a defendant's constitutional'due process rights will be subject
to stricter review.
In Rock, the Supreme Court applied Chambers to strike down a per se
exclusion of hypnotically refreshed recollection. 98 A state court had convicted
Rock of manslaughter for shooting her husband. 99 Rock had shot her husband
during an argument that evolved into a scuffle."° After the incident, Rock could
not remember the details of the shooting.' ' At the advice of her counsel, Rock
89. Id. at 291-92.
90. Id. at 292.
91. Id. at 292-93.
92. Id. at 293. Mississippi had not adopted the "statement against interest"
exception to the hearsay rule.
93. Id. at 302.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 302-03.
97. Id. at 295.
98. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 62 (1987).
99. Id. at 48.
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submitted to two sessions with a neuropsychologist trained in hypnosis. 2 Rock
recalled no new details during the hypnosis; however, she later recalled that the
gun had discharged when her husband had grabbed her arm. 3
The trial judge ordered that "no hypnotically refreshed testimony would be
admitted."'" Therefore, Rock's testimony contained only testimony about her
recollection before she underwent hypnosis.'0 5 In affirming the trial court, the
Arkansas Supreme Court held that hypnotically refreshed testimony is per se
inadmissible. 6 In deciding Rock, the Supreme Court had to decide whether
Arkansas's per se inadmissibility rule invaded Rock's right to present evidence
in her defense. The Court noted that the Compulsory Process Clause grants a
defendant the right to call witnesses on his behalf and applies to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment.0 7 The Court stated that "restrictions of a
defendant's right to testify may not be arbitrary or disproportionate to the
purpose they are designed to serve. In applying its evidentiary rules, a state must
evaluate whether the interests served by a rule justify the limitation imposed on
the defendant's constitutional right to testify."'0 8 The Court ruled that the
Arkansas Supreme Court's ruling was improper and held that the per se
inadmissibility rule "infringed impermissibly on the right of the defendant to
testify on his or her own behalf."'09
Rock's holding, of course, is confined to hypnotically refreshed testimony.
However, the Rock Court's rationale is applicable to polygraph evidence.
Before this decision, state and federal courts had developed three standards of
admissibility for hypnotically refreshed testimony: per se admissibility, per se
inadmissibility, and a qualified admissibility based on an adherence to
procedural safeguards." 0 Courts have developed similar standards for the
admissibility of polygraph evidence. Additionally, it should be noted that in its
holding in Rock, the Supreme Court asserted that "[a] state's legitimate interest
in barring unreliable evidence does not extend to per se exclusions that may be
reliable in an individual case."' While the facts of Rock limit this statement,
it is clear that a defendant should have the opportunity to argue the admissibility
of reliable exculpatory evidence on a case-by-case basis." 2
102. Id. at 46-47.
103. Id. at 47.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See Rock v. State, 708 S.W.2d 78, 79-81 (Ark. 1986), vacated by 483 U.S. 44
(1987).
107. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 62 (1987).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 62.
110. See Charles D. Gill, Jr., Note, The Admissibility of Hypnotically Refreshed
Testimony: Rock v. Arkansas, 30 B.C. L. REv. 573, 576 (1989).
111. Rock, 483 U.S. at 61.
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Taken together, Chambers and Rock stand for the proposition that a
defendant's constitutional rights to due process require that rules which interfere
with the defendant's right to present a defense must be examined closely in order
to prevent a denial of those constitutional rights. These cases further illustrate
that this inquiry should be made on a case-by-case basis.
In Scheffer, however, the Supreme Court ruled that a per se ban on
polygraph evidence was permissible despite statements contained in Chambers
and Rock which suggested a contrary result."3 Edward Scheffer, an airman in
the United States Air Force, was an informant in drug investigations of the Air
Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI)." 4 From time to time, OSI asked
Scheffer to submit to drug and polygraph testing."5 In early April 1992,
Scheffer provided a urine sample and agreed to take a polygraph test before the
results of the urinalysis were known.' 6 It was the opinion of the polygraph
examiner that the test indicated "no deception" when Scheffer denied any drug
use."17 Shortly thereafter, Scheffer went AWOL (Absent Without Leave) for
approximately two weeks until being discovered by the Iowa state patrol during
a routine traffic stop." 8 OSI agents later learned that Scheffer's urinalysis
revealed the presence of methamphetamine." 9
Scheffer was tried by general court martial on charges of using
methamphetamine as well as being AWOL and uttering seventeen insufficient
fund checks. 20 Scheffer denied having knowingly ingested methamphetamine
and sought to introduce his polygraph results as evidence in support of his
testimony.' The military judge excluded the testimony, relying on Military
Rule of Evidence 707, which provides, in pertinent part: "Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, the results of a polygraph examination, the opinion of a
polygraph examiner, or any reference to an offer to take, failure to take, or
taking of a polygraph examination, shall not be admitted into evidence."'
2
Scheffer was convicted.'23 The United States Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces reversed the conviction and held that "[a] per se exclusion of polygraph
evidence offered by an accused to rebut an attack on his credibility ... violates
his Sixth Amendment right to present a defense."' 124  The Supreme Court
113. United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998).
114. Id. at 305.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 305-06.





122. Id. at 306-307.
123. Id. at 307.
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reversed and stated that "[a] defendant's right to present relevant evidence is not
unlimited, but rather is subject to reasonable restrictions."'2 5  The Court's
opinion, written by Justice Thomas and joined by Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and
Souter, determined that Rule 707 served the legitimate interests of "ensuring that
only reliable evidence is introduced at trial, preserving the jury's role in
determining credibility, and avoiding litigation that is collateral to the primary
purpose of the trial."'2 6 However, the concurring opinion, written by Justice
Kennedy and joined by Jtistices O'Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer, agreed that
preserving the jury's role in determining credibility and avoiding litigation of
collateral issues were legitimate interests that justified a per se exclusion of
polygraph results. 2 7 Nonetheless, the concurring opinion agreed that "various
courts and jurisdictions 'may reasonably reach differing conclusions as to
whether polygraph evidence should be admitted."'128
While Scheffer gives constitutional validity to per se inadmissibility of
polygraph evidence, it should be noted that a majority of the Justices (Kennedy,
O'Connor, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Stevens) believed that per se exclusion of
polygraph evidence is unwise, 12 9 with Justice Stevens considering per se
exclusion unconstitutional.13
0
B. Admissibility By Stipulation
Several states admit polygraph evidence if the parties have stipulated to its
admissibility before a polygraph test is administered.' 3' A typical stipulation
will include the following: (1) The defendant will submit to a polygraph test; (2)
125. United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998).
126. Id. at 309.
127. Id. at318.
128. Id. at 318 (quoting majority opinion, id. at 312).
129. Id. at318.
130. Id. at 320.
131. Currently, eighteen states admit polygraph evidence on the basis of the parties'
stipulation: Alabama (Exparte Clements, 447 So. 2d 695, 697-98 (Ala. 1984)); Arizona
(State v. Rodriguez, 921 P.2d 643, 653 (Ariz. 1996)); Arkansas (Wingfield v. State, 796
S.W.2d 574, 576 (Ark. 1990)); California (CAL. EVID. CODE § 351.1 (West 1995));
Delaware (Melvin v. State, 606 A.2d 69, 71 (Del. 1992)); Florida (Davis v. State, 520 So.
2d 572, 573 (Fla. 1988)); Georgia (Forehand v. State, 477 S.E.2d 560, 562 (Ga. 1996));
Idaho (State v. Fain, 774 P.2d 252, 256 (Idaho), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 917 (1989));
Indiana (Sanchez v. State, 675 N.E.2d 306, 308 (Ind. 1996)); Iowa (State v. Losee, 354
N.W.2d 239, 242 (Iowa 1984)); Kansas (State v. Clemons, 929 P.2d 749, 753 (Kan.
1996)); Nevada (Kazalyn v. State, 825 P.2d 578, 582 (Nev. 1992)); New Jersey (State v.
Baskerville, 374 A.2d 441,442 (N.J. 1977)); North Dakota (City of Bismarck v. Berger,
465 N.W.2d 480, 481 (N.D. 1991)); Ohio (State v. Hesson, 675 N.E.2d 532, 540 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1996)); Utah (State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 642 (Utah 1996)); Washington
(State v. Gregory, 910 P.2d 505, 508 (Wash. 1996)); and Wyoming (Schmunk v. State,
714 P.2d 724, 731 (Wyo. 1986)); see also Peeples, supra note 50, at 115.
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The polygraph results and the examiner's opinion thereon will be admissible at
trial; (3) The judge may refuse to admit such evidence if the examiner is found
to be unqualified or the test is found to have been conducted under improper
circumstances; (4) The party opposing the offer of evidence shall have the right
to cross-examine the examiner; and (5) the judge will give a limiting instruction
to the jury on the weight of the examiner's testimony.132
The admission of polygraph by stipulation, while less offensive to
constitutional sensibilities than the per se inadmissibility approach, still does not
address fully the constitutional issues or other aspects of admissibility. For
instance, how does mere stipulation make evidence, which otherwise would be
considered inadmissible because of its lack of reliability, suddenly sufficiently
credible? It would seem that the stipulation does not make the evidence any
more reliable. In fact, a practical consequence is that stipulated evidence may
be less reliable. For example, if a defendant stipulates before the test that the
results will be admissible, it is likely that he is either innocent or believes that
he knows how to manipulate the test. If he is innocent and the test inaccurately
shows deception, the results will nonetheless be admissible. Likewise, an
attempt at manipulation, or a firm belief in one's ability to manipulate the test,
will have an affect on the results. Additionally, if the prosecution does not enter
into the stipulation, the defendant is still faced with the problem of not being
able to admit exculpatory evidence.
C. Admisiibility Under Certain Circumstances
Many jurisdictions, regardless of whether they generally adhere to
admissibility by stipulation or per se inadmissibility, will otherwise admit
polygraph evidence under certain circumstances.'33 The most typical exception
is when the polygraph evidence is introduced for a limited purpose unrelated to
132. Ronald J. Simon, Adopting a Military Approach to Polygraph Evidence
Admissibility: Why Federal Evidentiary Protections Will Suffice, 25 TEX. TECH. L. REV.
1055, 1069 (1994); see also State v. Valdez, 371 P.2d 894, 900-01 (Ariz. 1962) (setting
forth the following qualifications for admissibility: (1) any stipulation must be in writing;
(2) notwithstanding any stipulation, admissibility is subject to the trial judge's discretion;
(3) the opposing party retains the right to cross-examine the expert; and (4) the trial judge
should provide a detailed instruction to the jury concerning the weight of the evidence
and the purpose for which it is admitted).
133. See, e.g., State v. Catanese, 368 So. 2d 975, 982 (La. 1979) (admissible in
certain post-trial proceedings); State v. Baldwin, 808 S.W.2d 384, 392 (Mo. Ct. App.
1991) (admissible to rebut a negative inference raised by the protesting party); State v.
Dorsey, 539 P.2d 204, 204-05 (N.M. 1975) (admissible if(1) the operator was qualified,
(2) the testing procedures were reliable, and (3) the test of the particular subject was
valid); State v. Wright, 471 S.E.2d 700, 701 (S.C. 1996) (admissible at trial judge's
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the substantive correctness of the results. 34 For example, where admission of
polygraph evidence is necessary to show that a test was given, regardless and
irrespective of the results. 135 For this limited purpose, considerations of Daubert,
Frye, and constitutional issues are irrelevant.
V. MIssOURI
Missouri, along with several other states, has not adopted the Daubert
standard for the admission of scientific evidence. The Missouri Supreme Court
has consistently applied only the Frye test to the admission of expert testimony
since State v. Stout in 1972.136 Missouri lower courts have not adopted the
Daubert standard, despite various opportunities to do so. 37 This is true despite
the state legislature's adoption of a statute that contains wording nearly identical
to the federal rule on which the Daubert decision was based.13 1 Missouri courts
134. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 805 F.2d 1410, 1416-17 (10th Cir. 1986)
(admitting evidence concerning the fact that the defendant had failed a polygraph
examination in order to rebut an attempt by the defendant to impugn the quality of the
Government's investigation); Tyler v. United States, 193 F.2d 24, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1951)
(admitting testimony concerning the fact that the defendant confessed after he had been
told that he had "failed" a lie detector test in order to reveal the circumstances leading up
to the confession); State v. Baldwin, 808 S.W.2d 384, 392 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (allowing
the state to introduce evidence that a polygraph examination was given to rebut negative
inference created by the defendant's testimony about the length of his interrogation).
135. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 874 F.2d 1255, 1261 (9th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 894 (1993); United States v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 1337, 1341 (9th Cir.
1988).
136. 478 S.W.2d 368 (Mo. 1972).
137. See, e.g., State v. Kinder, 942 S.W.2d 313, 336 (Mo. 1996), cert. denied, 522
U.S. 854 (1997); State v. Swain, 997 S.W.2d 85, 86 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
138. Mo. REv. STAT. Section 490.065 reads as follows:
1. In any civil action, if scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise.
2. Testimony by such an expert witness in the form of an opinion or inference
otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate
issue to be decided by the trier of fact.
3. The facts or data in a particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion
or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the
hearing and must be of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field
in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject and must be otherwise
reasonably reliable.
4. If a reasonable foundation is laid, an expert may testify in terms of opinion
or inference and give the reasons therefor without the use of hypothetical
questions, unless the court believes the use of a hypothetical question will
2000]
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have rejected the argument that the adoption of this statute requires application
of Daubert rather than Frye.'39
In applying the Frye "general acceptance" test to polygraph evidence, the
courts have, in the end, adopted the per se inadmissibility rule, concluding that
"examination results lack wide scientific approval of their reliability and are
inadmissible."'40 Additionally, the Missouri Supreme Court has said that
polygraph tests are not uniformly sanctioned by the scientific community, they
contain a high degree of interpretive subjectivity, they are not susceptible to in-
court examinations and testing, and they are subject to an unusually high degree
of reliance by juries.141
For a period of time, Missouri courts allowed the introduction of polygraph
by stipulation of the parties. In State v. Fields,142 a division of the supreme court
held that admission of polygraph evidence after a pre-trial waiver of objections
by the parties did not infringe upon any of the defendant's constitutional rights
or privileges. 43 Despite the narrow holding of Fields, appellate courts began to
read the holding as permitting the admission of polygraph results where the
defendant had waived objections by a prior stipulation. 44 It was not until 1980,
in State v. Biddle, 41 that the Missouri Supreme Court again addressed the issue
and held that polygraph evidence is per se inadmissible notwithstanding a prior
stipulation.
46
make the expert's opinion more understandable or of greater assistance to the
jury due to the particular facts of the case.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 490.065 (1994).
139. See, e.g., Kinder, 942 S.W.2d at 326; Swain, 977 S.W.2d at 86.
140. State v. Biddle, 599 S.W.2d 182, 191 (Mo. 1980).
141. Id. at 187-90.
142. 434 S.W.2d 507 (Mo. 1968).
143. Id. at 515.
144. See, e.g., State v. Scott, 570 S.W.2d 813, 814-15 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (holding
that "the results of the polygraph examination administered to the defendant would have
been inadmissible as evidence because they lacked scientific support for their reliability.
However, the written stipulation entered into between the parties gave the polygraph
examination administered to defendant a legal aura of reliability, thereby infusing the
conclusive results obtained with probative value.") (citations omitted); State v. Mick, 546
S.W.2d 508, 509 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (stating that "[h]owever anomalous it may be, the
parties, by stipulation, may waive objections to the admission of polygraph examinations
and their results, and in that sense imbue them with reliability and probative value").
145. 599 S.W.2d 182 (Mo. 1980).
146. Id. at 185-87. The court listed seven reasons for its holding:
(1) A polygraph test is not independent proof of any fact, but merely bears on
the credibility of the defendant.
(2) The admission of the polygraph test has such an impact on the jury that the
truth seeking function of the trial will be destroyed.
(3) Unreliable evidence should not play a major part in the conviction or
acquittal of a person charged with a crime.
[Vol. 65
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While generally applying the per se inadmissibility rule, Missouri courts
have occasionally admitted polygraph evidence for specific purposes under
certain circumstances. It is well established in Missouri that evidence which
would otherwise be inadmissible is admissible in order to rebut an inference
created by the opposing party.'47 Missouri courts seem reluctant to apply this
premise to polygraph evidence, but have done so in appropriate circumstances . 48
VI. CONCLUSION
After Scheffer, it is clear that Missouri, at least for the time being, is on
constitutionally solid ground in regarding polygraph evidence as per se
inadmissible. However, it is becoming equally clear that, with the scientific and
technological advances of polygraph technology, Missouri may be excluding
evidence which is both reliable and probative in some circumstances. It is
obvious after Scheffer that either a change in the make-up of the Supreme Court,
or the development or discovery of better indications that polygraph evidence
is reliable in certain circumstances, could mean that a per se exclusion of
polygraph evidence may be found to violate the constitutional rights of an
accused in a Frye jurisdiction. It is equally clear after Scheffer that a per se
exclusion is probably a violation of an accused's constitutional rights in a
Daubert jurisdiction today.
In light of these new possibilities, Missouri courts should begin to re-
examine the arguments for and against the admission of polygraph evidence to
make certain that this evidence is not being rejected merely on reflex. While the
problems of admitting polygraph evidence are numerous and should not be taken
lightly, the constitutional right of the accused to present exculpatory evidence
may require that Missouri move away from per se exclusion toward a more
individualized, case-by-case determination.
MICHAEL J. LIGoNs
(4) A stipulation cannot make unreliable evidence reliable.
(5) A stipulation that makes unreliable evidence admissible is contrary to
public policy.
(6) A stipulation that unreliable evidence is reliable is really a stipulation of
law and therefore invalid.
(7) It would be inconsistent for a court to refuse to admit polygraph tests into
evidence because they are unreliable and then admit them into evidence by
stipulation.
Id. at 187 (quoting People v. Monigan, 390 N.E.2d 562, 563 (Ill. 1979)).
147. See State v. Odom, 353 S.W.2d 708, 711 (Mo. 1962).
148. See, e.g., State v. Baldwin, 808 S.W.2d 384, 387 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991)
(allowing the state to introduce evidence that a polygraph examination was given to rebut
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